Abstract. In this paper we present a new one-way function with collision resistance. The security of this function is based on the difficulty of solving a norm form equation. We prove that this function is collision resistant, so it can be used as a one-way hash function. We show that this construction probably provides a family of one-way functions.
Introduction
The most basic notion for cryptographic applications is the one-way function. This is a function which is "easy" to compute but "hard" to invert.
The notion of the one-way function is of central importance in cryptography. These functions are important building blocks for most of the protocols and play a fundamental role in verifying passwords and creating digital signatures. Their use is important for constructing a cryptographically secure pseudo-random-sequence generator. There is an extensive literature on oneway functions and their applications. We refer here only to two fundamental books [17] and [22] .
After all we have an important remark. Although one-way functions are widely believed to exist, and there are several conjectured candidate oneway functions which are widely used, we currently do not know how to prove mathematically (without any assumption) that they actually exist. In the rest of the paper we will say one-way function instead of candidate one-way function, which is a widely accepted convention in the literature.
The papers [24] , [18] , [5] and [14] show how to construct a one-way function. O. Goldreich, L. Levin and N. Nisan [8] make a one-to-one one-way function based on the hardness of inverting RSA and the discrete log problem.
J. Buchmann and S. Paulus [3] use results from algebraic number theory to construct a one-way function. It is based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem with respect to the ideal class group of algebraic number fields.
In this paper we present a new one-way function with collision resistance and avalanche effect. The hardness of inverting this function is indicated by the difficulty of solving a norm form equation. A norm form equation is a special case of a decomposable form equation. We will construct a function using a norm form; we will prove that this function is "easy" to compute and we will show facts indicating that it is "hard" to invert. There is an extensive literature on decomposable form equations and their applications. For results and further references we refer to the books and survey papers [2] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [23] , [6] and [21] .
The definition of one-way functions and their properties
In this paper we will use the modern notion of one-way functions based on complexity theory which involves probabilistic algorithms instead of deterministic ones. This setting was proposed first by Goldwasser and Micali [10] . The definition of a one-way function and a collection of one-way functions below are from the book of Goldwasser and Bellare [9] .
First we define the notion of negligible functions: 
where the probability is taken over choices of x, and the coin tosses of A. 1 
Probabilistic polynomial time
Let x R ∈ {0, 1} k denote that x is chosen randomly with uniform distribution from all possible binary words with length k.
The constant k is the security parameter which is identical with the binary length of the input of the cryptosystem and fixed at the time the cryptosystem is setup.
The meaning of Definition 2 is that the probability of the following event is negligable: One chooses x randomly with binary length k and computes y = f (x). The algorithm A computes from input k and y the output z such that f (z) = y.
This definition is less directly relevant to practice, but useful for theoretical purposes. However, in cryptography we must typically envisage not a single one-way function but a collection of them. 
satisfying the following conditions:
(1) There exists a PPT algorithm S 1 which on input k outputs an i ∈ I with maximum length k.
(2) There exists a PPT algorithm S 2 which on input
(4) For every PPT algorithm A there exists a negligible function ν A , such that for all sufficiently large k
where the probability is taken over choices of i and x, and the coin tosses of algorithm A.
The algorithm S 1 chooses the index and the algorithm S 2 chooses the input x from the domain which corresponds to the index i. The algorithm A 1 calculates the value f i (x), and the algorithm A tries to invert the function f i .
Remark 1.
One can show that the existence of a single one-way function is equivalent to the existence of a collection of one-way functions. For a proof see [9] .
Important properties of one-way functions are the collision resistance and the avalanche effect. Now we are presenting the definition of these notions. 
holds for any two distinct inputs x 1 = x 2 and sufficiently large k, where the probability is taken independently over all
Remark 2. In this definition (x 1 , x 2 ) is considered as a uniformly distributed vector variable. There is another property of f to find x 2 for fixed input x 1 or to find x 2 for fixed output f (x 1 ) such that f (x 1 ) = f (x 2 ). We call these properties 2nd-preimage resistance and preimage resistance respectively. For their definitions see [17] .
Remark 3. Obviously the one-to-one functions are collision resistant.
The notion of avalanche effect is discussed first in connection with the S-boxes of DES by Feistel, Notz and Smith [7] . Kam and Davida [15] called this property completeness and defined it in the following way: a function is complete if each output bit depends on all input bits. Webster and Tavares [25] proposed the more stringent notion of avalanche effect:
Definition 5. (Strict avalanche criterion) A function f has strict avalanche effect if whenever one input bit of f is changed, every output bit of f is changing with probability
More simply, a function has strict avalanche effect if the change of one input bit implies a change on the half of the output bits. We will measure the change of bits via Hamming-distance. Its definition is the following:
be the binary representations of the numbers x, y ∈ Z, respectively, where
The Hamming-distance of the numbers x and y is
where ⊕ denotes the exclusive-or operator.
One-way hash functions play also a fundamental role in modern cryptography.
Definition 7. The function f is a one-way hash function if f is a oneway, collision resistant function and f maps an input x of arbitrary finite bitlength to an output f (x) of fixed bitlength.
The widely used one-way hash functions (MD5, RIPE-MD, SHA) are based on block ciphers. For results and further references we refer to the books [17] and [22] .
3. The mappings N P and N P,s are one-way functions Let P (X) ∈ Z[X] be a fixed monic polynomial of degree n ≥ 3 having no multiple roots. Denote by α 1 , . . . , α n the roots of P and put
Define the norm form corresponding to the polynomial P by
In fact, N P (X) is a generalization of the concept of norm form and is a special decomposable form. Further, N P (X) is a homogeneous polynomial of degree n, with integer coefficients. (1)
Since N P (X) is a homogeneous polynomial with integer coefficients the function value N P (x) will be a rational integer for every x ∈ Z m . In the case when P is irreducible a detailed investigation of the complexity of the computation of the value N P (x) using three different methods can be found in [1] . In that paper we proved that the complexity of the determination of N P (x) using matrix representation combined with modular arithmetic is O(n 
which means that
where f kj (X) ∈ Z[X] are linear polynomials.
From cryptographical point of view it would be more convenient to work over finite domains. For s ∈ Z let Z s := Z/sZ. The best way to compute the value N P,s (x 1 , ..., x m ) is the method using matrix representation described in Theorem 2 in [1] , however the whole computation can be done mod s. The following theorem shows the complexity of the calculation of the value N P,s (x 1 , ..., x m ). 
, where x i ∈ Z s and the probability is taken over all values x i and the coin tosses of A.
We have the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Under SMNA the function N P,s is a one-way function.
Proof. We must show that the function N P,s satisfies the assumption of Definition 2. Since by Theorem 1 there exists a deterministic algorithm, which computes N P,s , assumption (1) of Definition 2 is satisfied. The assumption (2) of Definition 2 is an immediate consequence of SMNA. Thus our theorem is proved.
Using the function N P,s we can create a collection of one-way functions in the following way. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. If for all P (X) ∈ P condition SMNA holds for N P,s then MNFF is a collection of one-way functions.
Proof. We have to show that MNFF satisfies the assumption of Definition 3, provided that each function N P,s satisfies SMNA.
Obviously the domain and the codomain of each function N P,s is finite. The algorithm S 1 chooses randomly a polynomial P ∈ Z[X] of degree n(≥ 4) having no multiple roots.
The algorithm S 2 chooses the domain Z m s corresponding to x. Let the algorithm A 1 be the deterministic algorithm described in chapter 4 of [1] . This algorithm computes the value N P,s (x) ∈ Z from x ∈ Z m s . The complexity of this algorithm is polynomial in the input value x by Theorem 1.
Since the complexity of algorithms S 1 , S 2 and A 1 are polynomial thus assumptions (1), (2) and (3) of Definition 3 are satisfied.
Assumption (4) is an immediate consequence of SMNA. Thus Theorem 3 is proved.
Unfortunately we are not able to present pairs P, s for which SMNA holds. In the other direction we prove the following Proposition. However, if s is prime, then equation (3) can be solved in probabilistic polynomial time by Berlekamp's factorization algorithm (see [4] ).
Thus in the sequel we suppose that s = pq, where p and q are large rational primes. In this case the above method for breaking our one-way function candidate does not work, since the solution of equation (3) is computationally infeasible.
The properties of the function N P and N P,s
In this section we investigate the probability of the collision for the function N P,s , i. e. we are interested in the probability
Our main result is the following theorem. • If (b, s) = 1 we have
.
Theorem 5. Let P (X) ∈ Z[X] be a monic polynomial of degree at least 3 having no multiple roots. Let p and q be primes such that q > p > q/2 and s := pq. Suppose that gcd(m, ϕ(s)) = 1. Then the probability of collision P coll for the function N P,s satisfies the inequality
where the constant C depends only on the polynomial P .
To prove Theorem 4 we need two lemmas.
Lemma 1. Let P (X) ∈ C[X] be a polynomial, which has at least one simple zero. Then the polynomial Z
Proof of Lemma 1. This is a consequence of a theorem of Capelli (see e.g. [20] p.662).
Then the polynomial f (X) − a is irreducible for every 0 = a ∈ C.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose indirectly that f (X) − a is reducible. Put
It is easily seen that from the reducibility of f (X) − a follows the reducibility of f 0 (X j 1 , X j 2 ) − a. Indeed, if there exists a non-trivial factorization f (X) − a = g(X)h(X) of f (X) − a then using that the total degree of f (X) − a is n and 0 < deg
is also reducible over C. However, from (4) it follows that P (Y ) has a simple zero, and thus by Lemma 1 P (Y ) − Z n is irreducible, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 4. First suppose that gcd(b, s) = 1. Consider the equation N P (X 1 , ..., X m ) ≡ b (mod s) and put f := N P (X 1 , ..., X m ) − b. By Lemma 2 the polynomial f is absolutely irreducible. Indeed, we can choose i = 1, j 1 = 2 and j 2 = 1 and since now the condition required in Lemma 2 is α 1 ∈ {α 2 , . . . , α n }, and since P has no multiple roots this condition is fulfilled.
Now we can use a theorem of S. Lang and A. Weil [16] . By this theorem, if the prime modulus p is sufficiently large the number of solutions N (f, p) of the equation f ≡ 0 (mod p) satisfies the inequality
where the constant C(f ) depends only on the coefficients of the absolutely irreducible polynomial f . Further, we note that the constant C(f ) in our case does not depend on the value of b. Indeed, since gcd(m, ϕ(s)) = 1 for every 0 = b ∈ Z s there exists a 0 = a ∈ Z s such that a m ≡ b (mod s), and thus we have Proof of theorem 5. By (8) we have
Corollary 1. If the module s is sufficiently large then the function N P,s is collision resistant.
To test the avalanche effect of the function N P,s we used an implementation of these functions in the computer algebraic system MAPLE. Denote by x a binary input value and by x another binary input value, which differs in a single bit from x.
These implementations calculated the following relative Hamming-distances
where l(.) denotes the binary length function and ρ(., .) is the Hammingdistance described in Definition 6.
The tests were run 1000 times with randomly generated inputs with size 2
160
. The positions of the changed input bits in x were also randomly generated.
Conjecture 1. The function N P,s satisfies the strict avalanche criterion described in Definition 5.
Some applications
In the former sections we described some basic properties of norm form functions associated to polynomials with integer coefficients. Here we consider the same problem from a more practical point of view.
The functions N P,s is adaptable all the wonted cryptographically application namely checking data integrity, entity authentication, digital signatures and generation of pseudo random sequences. These functions can play an important role on building of cryptographic protocols.
Pseudorandom functions can be constructed also based on the one-way function N P,s .
The first question is how to choose P (X) such that the associated norm form could be easily calculated. Let P (X) := X n − 1. Denote ζ one of the primitive n-th roots of unity and let which has particular simple form. P (X) has only simple roots, hence the assumption of Theorem 4 is satisfied. Thus N P (X) is collision resistant. We propose to apply N P,s (X) as a hash function. In the practice hash functions map messages to 160 bit words. Hence s = pq should be about of this size. Unfortunately, in our case this setting is not secure, because 160 bit integers can be easily factorized and by Proposition 1 one can find arguments, which cause collision. Enlarging however the set of possible hash values to at least 2
1024
, our function becomes collision resistant. Hence s = pq should be about this size.
Choose the prime q of size 2
512
and then the prime p such that q > p > q/2. This is certainly possible by Tschebishev's theorem. Moreover we have to be aware of the condition gcd(m, (p − 1)(q − 1)) = 1. After choosing p and q appropriately put s = pq.
Having a message M consider it as a binary word and split it into subwords x If k is not of the form m + t(m − 1) with some suitable t ∈ Z then we can extend M with words representing 0 until k has the required form.
This function will keep collision free in all the steps of the iteration and has avalanche effect (see Theorem 4. and Conjecture 1.). These properties guarantee its security.
